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Abstract
This paper compares the importance of different sovereign credit rating determinants over time,
using a sample of 90 countries for the years 2002-2015. Applying the composite marginal likelihood
approach, we estimate a multi-year ordered probit model for each of the three major credit rating
agencies. After the start of the European debt crisis in 2009, the importance of the financial balance,
the economic development and the external debt increased substantially and the effect of eurozone
membership switched from positive to negative. In addition, GDP growth gained a lot of importance
for highly indebted sovereigns and government debt became much more important for countries with
a low GDP growth rate. These findings provide empirical evidence that the credit rating agencies
changed their sovereign credit rating assessment after the start of the European debt crisis.
Keywords: Composite marginal likelihood, Credit rating agencies, European debt crisis, Multi-year
ordered probit model, Sovereign credit rating determinants
JEL: C33, C35, F34, G24, H63
1. Introduction
A sovereign credit rating is a measure of the creditworthiness of a sovereign government assigned
by a credit rating agency (CRA). Each sovereign credit rating is determined by a rating committee,
which assesses the different factors that drive the sovereign’s creditworthiness. Rather than computing
a fixed weighted average of these factors, CRAs can vary the relative importance of the various factors
over time, in response to changing macroeconomic circumstances (Kiff et al., 2010). For instance,
Fitch (2014) states they attach more importance to the sovereign public finance ratios and financing
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flexibility during crisis periods and Gaillard (2012) argues that, before the outbreak of the European
debt crisis, CRAs attached too much value to both the advanced economy status and eurozone
membership of Greece. Even though the CRAs regularly publish reports in which they identify the
different ingredients of the sovereign credit rating, further judgmental adjustments are made by the
rating committee.1 Therefore, the actual degree of importance of the different variables and their
change over time is not known. In this paper, we quantify, for the three major rating agencies
Standard and Poor’s (S&P), Moody’s and Fitch, how the importance of different sovereign credit
rating determinants changed after the start of the European debt crisis.
Starting with Cantor and Packer (1996), an empirical literature has emerged that analyzes the
importance of the determinants of sovereign credit ratings using historical data. In their seminal
paper, Cantor and Packer (1996) report that their single-year linear regression model with eight
macroeconomic variables could explain more than 90% of the variability of the sovereign credit ratings
for 1995. In particular, they find a statistically significant effect of the variables GDP per capita,
GDP growth, inflation, external debt, the economic development and default history. Subsequent
research has confirmed the importance of these variables in explaining the sovereign credit rating
(Afonso et al., 2011; Gaillard, 2012; Gartner et al., 2011).
Only a few papers have compared the importance of the different credit rating determinants over
time. These papers predominantly analyze the change after the 1997-1998 Asian crisis and mostly use
linear regression models. Monfort and Mulder (2000) compare estimated coefficients of their panel
linear regression model between subperiods 1994-1995, 1996-1997 and 1997-1998. They find stable
coefficients across subperiods, with the exception of the export growth rate. Bissoondoyal-Bheenick
(2005) estimate single-year ordered probit regression models for the years 1995 to 1999 and finds
that mostly the same variables are statistically significant over the different years. Finally, Afonso
et al. (2007), estimating a panel linear regression model separately for the period 1996-2000 and 2001-
1Standard and Poor’s scores five key factors of a sovereign’s degree of creditworthiness on a six point scale. While
the calibration of both the scoring procedure of each factor and the procedure of combining the scores into a single
credit rating has been more objectively documented as from 2011, qualitative judgment still remains important in
this rating process (S&P, 2014b). Also Moody’s (2015b) uses a scorecard which maps different indicators to four key
factors, which are then combined to an initial sovereign credit rating. Although Moody’s provides indicative weights
of the different determinants of each of these factors, they emphasize that the actual weights can substantially deviate
because of supplementary adjustments based on qualitative judgment. Finally, the rating process of Fitch (2014) starts
from the rating prediction of a linear regression model in which 19 variables are regressed on historical Fitch sovereign
credit ratings and which is yearly re-estimated for a sample starting in 2000. Also here, the rating committee makes
substantial changes to this initial rating prediction.
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2006, conclude that most estimated coefficients are similar across subperiods, which they interpret
as evidence for a rather stable credit rating process over time.
This paper builds on above literature that compares the importance of the different factors of
sovereign credit ratings over time. Using a sample of 90 countries for the period 2002-2015, we
investigate if and how the importance of the sovereign credit rating determinants changed after the
start of the European debt crisis in 2009. This analysis is performed for each of the three major
rating agencies Standard and Poor’s (S&P), Moody’s and Fitch and the focus is predominantly on
common patterns over time. Estimating a multi-year ordered probit model using a composite marginal
likelihood estimation approach, we are the first to take into account both the ordinal nature of the
sovereign credit rating and the serial correlation of the error terms. We compare the importance of
the different credit rating determinants over time, whereas the existing literature that uses an ordered
probit model, has only analyzed the statistical significance and the sign of the estimated coefficients.
A difficulty is that the coefficients of different ordered probit models are not directly comparable over
time, because their scaling depends on the unobserved degree of residual variation (Allison, 1999).
While previous literature has predominantly focused on the impact of the Asian crisis on the
importance of the different credit rating determinants, we analyze the impact of the European debt
crisis. For each of the three major credit rating agencies, we find that, after the start of the European
debt crisis in 2009, the importance of the financial balance, the economic development and the
external debt increased substantially and that the effect of eurozone membership switched from
positive to negative. In addition, GDP growth gained a lot of importance, especially for highly
indebted sovereigns, and government debt became much more important, especially for countries
with a low GDP growth rate. These findings provide empirical evidence that the CRAs changed their
sovereign credit rating assessment after the start of the European debt crisis.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data and Section 3 presents the multi-
year ordered probit model. Then, Section 4 discusses the results and Section 5 concludes our findings.
2. Data
We use data for the T = 14 years between 2002 and 2015. For the three major rating agencies
S&P, Moody’s and Fitch, we have a balanced panel dataset for respectively 85, 90 and 69 advanced
and emerging countries, listed in Table A.2 of Appendix A. End of year sovereign credit ratings are
obtained from S&P, Moody’s and Fitch and the different rating categories are shown in Table A.1 of
Appendix A.
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Table 1: Definitions of the explanatory variables, the source of the data and the expected sign of the impact on the
credit rating.
Variable name Definition Source Sign
GDP per capita GDP per capita, PPP (international dollars) IMF, WEO Oct2015 +
Government debt General government gross debt (% of GDP) IMF, WEO Oct 2015 -
GDP growth Real GDP growth (annual %) IMF, WEO Oct 2015 +
Eurozone membership Member country of the European Monetary Union ECB +/-
Financial Balance Financial balance (% of GDP) Moody’s (2015a) -
Economic development Member country of the OECD OECD +
External debt External debt (% of GDP) (developing countries) Moody’s (2015a) -
Current account Current account balance (% of GDP) IMF, WEO Oct 2015 +/-
Inflation Inflation, end of period consumer prices (annual %) IMF, WEO Oct 2015 -
Default history Sovereign default since 1975 Beers and Nadeau (2015) -
We use ten rating determinants in our model. We include GDP per capita, government debt, GDP
growth, inflation, financial balance, external debt, current account and dummy variables for economic
development and default history, which have been previously shown to be important drivers for the
creditworthiness (Afonso et al., 2011; Cantor and Packer, 1996; Elkhoury, 2007; Gaillard, 2012). In
addition, we include the dummy variable for eurozone membership, which importance is expected to
have changed after the European debt crisis. The data definitions, data sources and expected sign of
the effect of the determinants on the credit rating are shown in Table 1 and summary statistics are
shown in Table 2.
Table 2: Summary statistics for each variable, computed over all observations that have an S&P rating for the years
2002 to 2015.
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
GDP per capita 1353.00 10300.00 20110.00 24940.00 35160.00 149600.00
Government debt 0.06 28.50 43.46 52.11 67.63 246.20
GDP growth -15.14 1.55 3.30 3.44 5.47 26.17
Eurozone membership 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 1.00
Financial balance -32.30 -4.38 -2.30 -1.86 -0.10 40.80
Economic development 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.36 1.00 1.00
External debt 0.00 0.00 25.80 33.38 45.95 965.00
Current account -53.56 -4.55 -0.83 0.04 3.67 45.22
Inflation -4.90 1.61 3.08 4.64 5.86 190.00
Default history 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.52 1.00 1.00
For each of the determinant, the expected sign of its effect on the credit rating is motivated as
follows:
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- GDP per capita: Countries with a higher GDP per capita are expected to have a higher sovereign
credit rating, conditioning on the other variables in the model. These countries have a higher
potential tax base and they often have a sound political and institutional stability.
- Government debt : Countries with a higher level of government debt relative to GDP are
expected to have a lower sovereign credit rating.
- GDP growth: Countries with a higher GDP growth rate are expected to have a higher sovereign
credit rating, because a higher GDP growth rate is indicative for a higher future GDP growth
rate, which increases the future potential tax base and reduces the future government debt to
GDP ratio.
- Eurozone membership: Membership to the eurozone monetary union2 has an ambiguous impact
on the sovereign credit rating of its member states. On the one hand, enforceable rules for fiscal
discipline, such as the Stability and Growth Pact, increase the fiscal credibility of its member
states (Afonso et al., 2011; Gartner et al., 2011). Eurozone membership also provides several
economic advantages for member states, such as decreased transaction costs and reduced price
uncertainty, which lead to increased trade and economic activity. Another advantage is that the
euro is an actively traded currency, such that the member country can more easily issue debt
in domestic currency (S&P, 2014a). On the other hand, many researchers such as De Grauwe
and Ji (2013), state that member countries in a monetary union are prone to a self-fulfilling
liquidity crisis. As these member countries cannot force the central bank to alleviate a liquidity
crisis by buying their government debt, they can face higher interest rates during a liquidity
crisis. This high interest rate, together with the fact that economic growth cannot be boosted
through currency depreciation, implies that a liquidity crisis can easily spillover into a solvency
crisis.
- Financial balance: A positive financial balance relative to GDP signals that the government is
able and willing to increase taxes or reduce expenses in order to service its debt.
- Economic development : Countries that are classified as economically developed, are expected to
have a higher credit rating. They are perceived to have attained a certain threshold of economic
development for which default is very unlikely. In addition, these countries are often strongly
2Note that we do not investigate the effect of membership to other currency unions, since too few of such members
received a sovereign credit rating.
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integrated with the world economy, such that a default is less likely, as foreign creditors can
more easily disrupt trade or seize assets abroad in case of default (Cantor and Packer, 1996).
- External debt : Countries with a high external debt relative to GDP have a high total debt
burden, such that additional taxes or reduced government expenses are needed in order to
reduce the government’s debt or to support over-indebted domestic borrowers (Afonso et al.,
2011). Given that data on the external debt is missing for many industrialized countries, we
only analyze its effect for developing countries (as defined in Moody’s, 2015a), by setting the
external debt to zero for the industrialized countries, in line with Hill et al. (2010) and Afonso
et al. (2011).
- Current account : The current account balance of a country has an unclear impact on its
sovereign credit rating. While a current account surplus is expected to positively impact
the credit rating, the effect of a current account deficit on the credit rating depends on the
productivity of the investment it finances.
- Inflation: A high inflation rate may be a symptom of macroeconomic problems and can
lead to dissatisfied inhabitants and corresponding political instabilities (Afonso et al., 2011;
Bissoondoyal-Bheenick et al., 2006). This negative effect is partly offset because a high inflation
also lowers the real stock of outstanding government domestic currency debt and because an
inflation that is too low may lead to a deflationary spiral.
- Default history : Sovereigns that have previously defaulted on their debt, are seen as being less
willing to repay their debt.
Finally, we also add the interaction term3 between GDP growth and government debt to the model,
because GDP growth matters more for the sovereign’s creditworthiness, if the level of government
debt is high. In particular, an increase in the GDP growth rate, reduces the future government debt
ratio, hence increases the sovereign’s creditworthiness, by an amount proportional to the debt ratio.4
We expect this interaction effect to be positive.
3The interaction term is computed as the product of the centered GDP growth rate and the centered government
debt ratio, in which the overall mean is used to center the variables (i.e. 3.348 for GDP growth rate and 52.455 for
government debt).
4Indeed, keeping the total real amount of government debt constant, we would have that next year’s government
debt ratio equals d
1+g
≈ d− dg, with g the real GDP growth rate and d the present debt ratio.
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3. Methodology
In early research on the determinants of sovereign credit ratings, a linear regression model was
used in which the dependent variable credit rating was transformed to a linear scale. We believe
this linear model to be inappropriate for two reasons. First, the linear regression model assumes
that the absolute distances in the underlying degree of creditworthiness between subsequent credit
rating categories are equally spaced. This assumption is not realistic for credit ratings as they are
only ordinal measures for the sovereign’s degree of creditworthiness, see e.g. Afonso et al. (2011),
Bissoondoyal-Bheenick (2005) and Mora (2006). Second, McKelvey and Zavoina (1975) have shown
that, even if the degree of creditworthiness were equally spaced between rating categories, applying
linear regression to ordinal data would still result in a bias in the estimated coefficients. Christensen
(2015) state that this bias of the linear model is small only if there are many response categories and
the responses do not pile up in the end categories. Given that 17%, 19% and 21% percent of ratings
has the highest rating category for S&P, Moody’s and Fitch respectively, the bias is hence expected
to be considerable.
The ordered regression model is not subject to the above discussed disadvantages of the linear
regression model and it is increasingly used for modeling sovereign credit ratings. Bissoondoyal-
Bheenick (2005) and Gaillard (2012) use a single-year ordered regression model for sovereign credit
ratings. Also, Hill et al. (2010) and Hu et al. (2002) estimate an ordered regression model, pooling data
from multiple years. These single-year and pooled ordered probit models do not exploit the panel data
structure of sovereign credit ratings, collected over a span of fourteen years. Subsequently, Afonso
et al. (2009) and Mora (2006) estimate a panel ordered probit model, respectively using random and
fixed effects. However, as these models assume that both the regression coefficients and threshold
parameters are constant over time, they do not allow for a comparison of the coefficients over time.
We use a multi-year ordered probit regression model, which allows for time variation in the
regression coefficients and explicitly models the correlation between the error terms over the years.
Our model is similar to the cross-sectional multivariate ordered response model used by Bhat et al.
(2010) and Ferdous et al. (2010) to assess the determinants of the level of non-work activities for
different activity types.
3.1. The multi-year ordered probit regression model
Consider the latent regression equation
Y ∗it = β
′
txit + νit (1)
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for i in 1, ..., N and t in 1, ..., T , where N is the number of countries and T is the number of time
periods, Y ∗it is an unobserved latent variable measuring the degree of creditworthiness of sovereign i
at time t, xit is a vector of p explanatory variables of sovereign i at time t, βt is a vector of unknown
parameters at time t, and (νi1, ..., νiT ) are jointly standard normally distributed error terms with
correlation matrix Σ.5 In order to reduce the number of free parameters in the correlation matrix Σ,
we hypothesize, in line with Varin and Czado (2010), that the error term of each sovereign i follows
an autoregressive process of order one with common autoregressive parameter ρ, so that the element
of Σ at row s and column t, is given by Σst = ρ
|t−s|.
The threshold specification is given by
Yit =

1 if −∞ < Y ∗it < τ1t
l if τ l−1t ≤ Y ∗it < τ lt for l = 2, . . . , Ct − 1
Ct if τ
Ct−1
t ≤ Y ∗it <∞
(2)
for i in 1, ..., N and t in 1, ..., T , where Yit is the observed credit rating, τ
l
t is a threshold parameter
and Ct represents the number of observed rating categories in the sample for time t.
6 For notation
purpose, we label τ0t = −∞ and τCtt =∞. In sum, the parameters of the model are the pT coefficients
βt, the
∑T
t=1(Ct − 1) threshold parameters τ lt and the correlation parameter ρ, and we collect them
in the vector θ.
3.2. The likelihood function
The likelihood function is given by
L(θ) =
N∏
i=1
Li(θ), (3)
where Li(θ) is the likelihood for sovereign i, given by
Li(θ) = P (Yi1 = yi1 , . . . , YiT = yiT )
=
τ
yi1
1 −β′1xi1∫
νi1=τ
yi1−1
1 −β′1xi1
. . .
τ
yiT
T −β′T xiT∫
νiT=τ
yiT−1
T −β′T xiT
φ(νi1, ..., νiT ; Σ) dνi1...dνiT , (4)
5The scaling of the variances of the error terms νit to 1 and the absence of intercept coefficients are necessary to
identify the model parameters.
6If a certain rating category is not observed in the sample, there is no information in the data to identify its
corresponding threshold parameter. Although each CRA has 21 rating categories, the number of observed different
rating categories Ct varies over the years between 16 and 19 for S&P, between 17 to 19 for Moody’s and between 15
to 18 for Fitch.
8
where yit is the observed category number of variable Yit and φ(νi1, ..., νiT ; Σ) is the density of the
multivariate normal distribution with mean zero and correlation matrix Σ.
Since the T -dimensional integral in (4) cannot be easily computed for dimensions larger than two,
a classical maximum likelihood estimation is not feasible. One could approximate the T -dimensional
integral in (4) using simulation techniques, but the corresponding simulated maximum likelihood
estimator should not be used for high dimensional multivariate ordered response settings, due to
computational convergence issues (Bhat et al., 2010).
3.3. The composite likelihood estimator
The composite likelihood estimator θˆ (Bhat et al., 2010) maximizes the composite likelihood
function
LC(θ) =
N∏
i=1
LCi (θ), (5)
with LCi (θ) the pairwise marginal likelihood function for sovereign i
LCi (θ) =
T−1∏
s=1
T∏
t=s+1
P (Yis = yis, Yit = yit) , (6)
where yis and yit denote the observed category of variables Yis and Yit, and P (Yis = yis, Yit = yit) is
the probability of their joint occurrence. It is a consistent and asymptotically normally distributed
estimator with covariance matrix Cov(θˆ), and it is only slightly less efficient than the full maximum
likelihood estimator. Complete expressions for the composite likelihood function, the estimates of
Cov(θˆ) and implementation details of the composite likelihood estimator are given in Appendix B.
3.4. Comparing coefficients over time in the multi-year ordered probit model
The estimated coefficient βˆvt represents the estimated effect for time t of a one unit increase in
the variable v on the underlying degree of creditworthiness Y ∗it , keeping the other variables constant.
However, a direct comparison over time of these estimated coefficients is not meaningful, because the
unit of measurement of the unobserved underlying degree of creditworthiness Y ∗it differs over time
(Allison, 1999). This change in unit of measurement arises because the variances of the error terms
in the ordered regression model are scaled to one.
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As a solution, we apply the approach of Hoetker (2004) and Hoetker (2007), originally proposed
for comparing coefficients across binary choice models. This entails a scaling of the coefficients across
time. Let GDP per capita be the first variable. We will analyze the ratio Rvt , which we call the
importance of the variable,
Rvt =
βvt
βGDPt
for v in 2, ..., p and t in 1, ..., T , (7)
where βGDPt is the coefficient of the variable GDP per capita. The interpretation of this ratio is that,
ceteris paribus, a one unit increase in the variable of interest is expected to have the same effect on
the degree of creditworthiness as an increase in GDP per capita by the amount equal to the value of
this ratio. This ratio can also been interpreted in terms of the ‘compensating variation’ used in Boes
and Winkelmann (2006), Train (1998) and Train (2003): it represents the required increase in GDP
per capita necessary to offset a one unit decrease of the variable v, such that the sovereign’s degree
of creditworthiness remains the same.
The importance Rvt is estimated by the sample counterpart of (7), where the coefficients β
v
t and
βGDPt are replaced by their composite likelihood estimate of Section 3.3. The estimated covariance
matrix of Rˆvt is obtained using the Delta method and the estimated covariance matrix, given in
Appendix B.2.
4. Results
4.1. Estimated importance of the credit rating determinants
For the different determinants v and the different time periods t, Figures 1, 2 and 3 show the
estimated ratio Rˆvt , as defined in Section 3.4, for S&P, Moody’s and Fitch, respectively.
7 As elaborated
in Section 3.4, this ratio quantifies the importance of each determinant, as it represents the required
increase in GDP per capita necessary to offset a one unit decrease of the determinant such that the
sovereign’s degree of creditworthiness remains the same. The figures also show the 95% confidence
bounds. We detect important changes in the importance of the different variables after the start of the
European debt crisis in 2009. Averages for the estimated importance Rˆvt over the period 2002-2008
and over the period 2009-2015 are shown in Table 3.
7Note that for each variable v and time period t, the estimated importance Rˆvt and the estimated coefficient βˆ
v
t have
the same sign and a similar significance pattern, because the estimated ordered probit coefficient of GDP per capita
βˆGDPt is positive and significant for each year (the estimated ordered probit coefficients are available upon request).
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Table 3: For each variable and each CRA, the table shows the average estimated importance Rˆvt for the period 2002-
2008 (left panel) and for the period 2009-2015 (middle panel), as well as the P-values of the Wald hypothesis test that
the average importance is the same for both periods (right panel).
Average Rˆv2002−2008 Average Rˆ
v
2009−2015 H0: No break in 2009
S&P Moody’s Fitch S&P Moody’s Fitch S&P Moody’s Fitch
Eurozone membership 13038 10464 8249 -7581 -15502 -3688 0.000 0.002 0.000
Financial balance 78 26 78 1171 1013 882 0.001 0.031 0.004
Economic development 19720 40804 7303 31961 36393 14321 0.006 0.552 0.004
External debt -111 -121 -54 -243 -284 -147 0.000 0.001 0.000
GDP growth × Government debt 5 5 -1 18 39 13 0.072 0.008 0.054
GDP growth -163 115 -92 578 693 560 0.030 0.240 0.037
Government debt -166 -186 -104 -215 -221 -118 0.206 0.564 0.648
Current account -211 -317 -140 -148 -163 -300 0.655 0.478 0.274
Inflation -581 -960 -655 -514 -796 -446 0.706 0.632 0.179
Default history -17379 -34163 -12593 -22046 -30312 -14803 0.219 0.591 0.475
The effect of eurozone membership, fiscal balance, economic development and external debt
on the credit rating changed substantially after 2009. (i) While the estimated importance of
eurozone membership was statistically significant and positive before 2009, on average about 10000,
it substantially decreased after 2009 and became significant and negative, on average about −8000,
−15000 and −4000 for S&P, Moody’s and Fitch, respectively. (ii) While before 2009, the importance
of the financial balance to GDP ratio was insignificant, it became significant and positive afterwards.
After 2009, a one percentage point increase in the financial balance is expected to have the same effect
on the credit rating as an increase in GDP per capita by about 1000$, on average. (iii) The estimated
importance of economic development increased after 2009 for S&P and Fitch. For Moody’s, however,
the picture is less clear. (iv) The importance of external debt is significant and negative for all years,
but it decreased from about −100 before 2009 to about −250 for the period after 2009.
Also the effect of government debt and GDP growth rate on the credit rating changed substantially
after 2009. The graphs of the importance of GDP growth and government debt correspond to a
country with an average value for these variables. (i) The interaction term between GDP growth
rate and government debt is significant and positive between 2009 and 2013. (ii) For a country with
an average debt ratio, the importance of GDP growth rate was insignificant for the years before
2009 and positive and often significant for the years after 2009. For a highly indebted sovereign
with a government debt ratio of 100% (i.e. the 90% percentile of the government debt ratio in our
sample), the total effect of a one percentage point increase of GDP growth after 2009 is equivalent
to an increase in GDP per capita of about 1400$, 2600$ and 1200$ for S&P, Moody’s and Fitch,
14
respectively. In contrast, for a lowly indebted sovereign with a government debt ratio of 20% (i.e. the
10% percentile of the government debt ratio), the total effect of a one percentage point increase of
GDP growth has remained close to zero. (iii) For a country with an average GDP growth rate, the
importance of government debt has the expected negative sign and is significant for most years; it
increased in magnitude by about 20% after 2009. For countries with a GDP growth rate of -1% (the
10% percentile), the importance of government debt increased substantially in magnitude after 2009
to -300, -400, -180 for S&P, Moody’s and Fitch, respectively, whereas the importance of government
debt remained equal to about -150 for countries with a growth rate of 6% (the 90% percentile).
The estimated importance of the other variables remained relatively constant over the sample
period. (i) The current account balance is insignificant for nearly all years. (ii) The estimated effect
of a one percentage point decrease in inflation is significant for most years and corresponds to an
increase in GDP per capita of about 550$, 880$ and 550$ for S&P, Moody’s and Fitch, respectively.
(iii) The estimated importance of the default history is negative and significant. In particular, the
impact of having defaulted in the last decades is equivalent to an increase in GDP per capita by
about -19000$, -32000$ and -14000$ for S&P, Moody’s and Fitch, respectively.
Finally, the estimated autoregressive parameter ρ of the error term νit is large: 0.965, 0.953 and
0.961 for S&P, Moody’s and Fitch, respectively. In words, a sovereign which received a higher (lower)
rating than expected based on the rating determinants for a given year, is also very likely to have a
higher (lower) rating than expected for the following years. This high persistence of the error terms
strengthens the benefit of using a multi-year ordered probit model as the efficiency gain over the
estimation of a single-year ordered probit model is substantial when the correlation of the error terms
is large. Note that we did not discuss the time variation of the threshold parameters, given that their
interpretation is not of interest for this paper (results are available upon request).
4.2. Test for a break
We perform two hypothesis tests. First, we test for each variable v, the hypothesis that its
importance is constant across all years
H0 : R
v
1 = ... = R
v
T . (8)
Table 4 shows the P-value of the Wald test for this null hypothesis. For most variables and CRAs, we
reject this null hypothesis at the 5% significance level, which motivates the use of a model that allows
for time variation in the ordered probit coefficients, rather than a fixed coefficients panel model.
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Table 4: P-values of the Wald test for the null hypothesis that the importance Rvt is equal for all years.
H0: Equality for all years
S&P Moody’s Fitch
Eurozone membership 0.000 0.000 0.006
Financial balance 0.001 0.000 0.079
Economic development 0.182 0.001 0.038
External debt 0.000 0.000 0.004
GDP growth × Government debt 0.000 0.018 0.018
GDP growth 0.005 0.013 0.036
Government debt 0.035 0.022 0.038
Current account 0.120 0.059 0.091
Inflation 0.000 0.238 0.000
Default history 0.132 0.039 0.004
Second, we test, for each variable v in 2, ..., p, the hypothesis that the average importance is equal
before and after 2009, which is the start of the European debt crisis
H0 :
1
7
2008∑
t=2002
Rvt =
1
7
2015∑
t=2009
Rvt . (9)
The right panel of Table 3 shows the P-value of the Wald test for this null hypothesis. For most CRAs,
the hypothesis of no break in 2009 is strongly rejected for eurozone membership, the financial balance,
the economic development, the external debt, GDP growth and the interaction effect between GDP
growth and government debt. Therefore, the previously discussed changes in the importance of these
variables after 2009 are also statistically significant.
4.3. Discussion
In sum, for S&P, Moody’s and Fitch, we find that the importance of the financial balance, the
economic development and the external debt increased substantially in magnitude after 2009 and that
the effect of eurozone membership switched from positive to negative. In addition, GDP growth and
government debt, as well as their interaction, gained much importance, such that the positive effect
of GDP growth on the credit rating became considerable, especially for highly indebted sovereigns,
and that the negative effect of government debt became large, especially for low growth countries.
These empirical findings indicate a change in the sovereign credit rating assessment of CRAs after
the start of the European debt crisis. There are several possible explanations for this change.
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A first explanation is that credit rating agencies had badly judged the importance of the different
credit rating determinants with respect to default risk before 2009 and that they have permanently
adjusted their rating methodology after the European debt crisis experience. Kiff et al. (2010) provide
a similar argument for the change of importance of short term debt after the Asian crisis.
A second explanation is that this change only holds temporary for the duration of the European
sovereign debt crisis. This interpretation would be in line with Fitch (2014), who states that during
crisis periods, a higher weight is attached to sovereign’s finance ratios (as government debt and
financial balance) and financing flexibility. The larger weight of the sovereign’s financing flexibility is
reflected in the negative effect of eurozone membership after 2009, since eurozone member countries
cannot force the central bank to provide them with sufficient liquidity.
4.4. Model fit
We compare the model fit of our multi-year ordered probit model to that of the single-year ordered
probit model, the pooled ordered probit model, the multi-year seemingly unrelated linear regression
(SUR) model and the single year OLS linear regression model.8 Table 5 shows the mean absolute
error (MAE)9 and, in line with Afonso et al. (2007), the percentage of prediction errors that are
within x notches, where x ranges between 0 and 6. The single-year and multi-year ordered probit
outperform the OLS and SUR linear regression and the pooled ordered probit. They have on the
whole the lowest MAE (about 1.5) and the highest proportion of the ratings are correctly predicted
within 0 and 1 notches (about 30% and 55%).
Table 6 presents the frequency of upgrades and downgrades of the actual and the predicted
ratings, together with the percentage of correctly predicted up/down grades, i.e. the percentage of
time points where the sign of the change of the actual and predicted ratings coincide (similar as in
Afonso et al., 2007). The multi-year ordered probit model performs best: averaged over the three
CRAs, it correctly predicts 44% of the rating upgrades and 56% of the rating downgrades. Finally,
note that rating changes occur more often for the fitted ratings of all models (on average 23% for
upgrades and 19% for downgrades) compared to actual ratings (on average 14% for upgrades and
8For the OLS and SUR linear regression models, we have transformed the 21 credit rating categories of Table A.1 to
an equally spaced linear scale ranging between 1 and 21, in line with Bissoondoyal-Bheenick et al. (2006) and Giacomino
(2013). In line with Afonso et al. (2007), we round the predicted value of the OLS and SUR model to the nearest
integer between 1 and 21. Finally, we compute the prediction of the multi- and single-year ordered probit models Yˆit,
as the rating category l for which τˆ l−1t ≤ βˆ′txit < τˆ lt .
9For the calculation of the mean absolute error, we consider the distance between subsequent rating categories to
be one, in line with the linear scale used for the OLS and SUR linear regression models.
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Table 5: Mean absolute error (MAE) and the percentage of ratings that are correctly predicted within x notches, where
x ranges between 0 and 6.
MAE % correctly predicted within x notches
x = 0 x = 1 x = 2 x = 3 x = 4 x = 5 x = 6
S
&
P
Multi-year ordered probit 1.57 0.28 0.56 0.77 0.89 0.96 0.99 0.99
Single-year ordered probit 1.51 0.31 0.58 0.78 0.90 0.95 0.98 0.99
Pooled ordered probit 1.72 0.26 0.54 0.74 0.86 0.94 0.97 0.99
SUR linear regression 1.79 0.18 0.49 0.74 0.88 0.96 0.98 0.99
OLS linear regression 1.60 0.22 0.55 0.79 0.90 0.96 0.99 0.99
M
o
o
d
y
’s
Multi-year ordered probit 1.59 0.30 0.55 0.77 0.88 0.95 0.98 0.99
Single-year ordered probit 1.53 0.32 0.57 0.78 0.89 0.95 0.97 0.99
Pooled ordered probit 1.81 0.26 0.50 0.72 0.85 0.93 0.96 0.98
SUR linear regression 1.88 0.17 0.48 0.71 0.87 0.94 0.97 0.99
OLS linear regression 1.62 0.22 0.56 0.77 0.90 0.96 0.98 1.00
F
it
c
h
Multi-year ordered probit 1.28 0.39 0.67 0.84 0.93 0.96 0.98 0.99
Single-year ordered probit 1.24 0.39 0.67 0.87 0.94 0.96 0.98 0.99
Pooled ordered probit 1.52 0.31 0.61 0.80 0.90 0.94 0.97 0.98
SUR linear regression 1.55 0.25 0.57 0.81 0.92 0.97 0.98 0.99
OLS linear regression 1.37 0.25 0.64 0.86 0.95 0.98 0.98 0.99
Table 6: The percentage of upgrades (downgrades) of the actual and the predicted ratings and the percentage of
correctly predicted upgrades (downgrades).
Upgrades Downgrades
Actual Predicted %Correct Actual Predicted %Correct
S
&
P
Multi-year ordered probit 0.16 0.22 0.45 0.11 0.18 0.49
Single-year ordered probit 0.16 0.27 0.45 0.11 0.23 0.45
Pooled ordered probit 0.16 0.19 0.29 0.11 0.13 0.32
SUR linear regression 0.16 0.19 0.34 0.11 0.16 0.46
OLS linear regression 0.16 0.27 0.40 0.11 0.23 0.45
M
o
o
d
y
’s
Multi-year ordered probit 0.13 0.21 0.39 0.09 0.19 0.62
Single-year ordered probit 0.13 0.28 0.43 0.09 0.24 0.52
Pooled ordered probit 0.13 0.21 0.33 0.09 0.16 0.44
SUR linear regression 0.13 0.17 0.43 0.09 0.16 0.59
OLS linear regression 0.13 0.27 0.45 0.09 0.24 0.53
F
it
c
h
Multi-year ordered probit 0.14 0.21 0.46 0.09 0.16 0.57
Single-year ordered probit 0.14 0.25 0.41 0.09 0.22 0.59
Pooled ordered probit 0.14 0.21 0.30 0.09 0.13 0.44
SUR linear regression 0.14 0.17 0.40 0.09 0.15 0.59
OLS linear regression 0.14 0.28 0.40 0.09 0.26 0.61
10% for downgrades), in line with the findings of Hu et al. (2002). This lower number of actual rating
changes can be explained by a trade-off in the CRAs’ rating system between stability and accuracy
(Cantor and Mann, 2007; Gaillard, 2012).
5. Conclusion
This paper compares the importance of ten determinants of sovereign credit ratings over time
for the three main credit rating agencies, using a sample of 90 countries for the years 2002-2015.
Applying a composite marginal likelihood estimation approach, we estimate a multi-year ordered
probit model.
We provide empirical evidence that the credit rating agencies changed their sovereign credit rating
assessment after the start of the European debt crisis in 2009. The financial balance, the economic
development and the external debt became substantially more important after 2009, and the effect of
eurozone membership switched from positive to negative. In addition, GDP growth and government
debt, as well as their interaction, gained much importance, such that the positive effect of GDP
growth on the credit rating became considerable, especially for highly indebted sovereigns, and that
the negative effect of government debt became large, especially for low growth countries. Very recent
papers confirm some of our findings. Comparing estimated single-year linear regression coefficients
between the year 2007 and the year 2015, Amstad and Packer (2015) find that the government debt to
GDP ratio, the GDP growth rate and the flexibility of the exchange rate regime was more important
for the latter year. Also Boumparis et al. (2015) and Giacomino (2013) find that government debt
became more important after 2008, using a panel linear regression model.
We believe that our empirical model with ten determinants provides a good understanding of the
credit rating process: the in sample predictions have an average absolute error of about 1.5 notches,
they could correctly predict about 50% of rating up- and downgrades and about 55% of them lie
within one notch of the actual rating. Still, we acknowledge that our model remains a simplified
representation of the complex sovereign credit rating process of the CRAs, which incorporates
hundreds of variables as well as subjective judgment, and which can vary the relevance of the different
determinants across countries (S&P, 2008). A related limitation is that we model end of year sovereign
credit ratings using variables, such as GDP per capita and inflation, which are published and revised
several months after the end of the year. On the other hand, rating agencies do have access to other
data series such as surveys, which could inform on the current values of these variables.
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Finally, our approach of analyzing the ratio of each coefficient relative to the coefficient of GDP
per capita, has the limitation that a change in this ratio does not inform per se on whether the
importance of the numerator variable has changed or whether the importance of the denominator
variable GDP per capita has changed. However, both a seemingly unrelated linear regression analysis
and the linear regression model of Amstad and Packer (2015) indicate that the importance of GDP
per capita was relatively constant over time (ignoring the bias that results from applying such linear
regression models). This strengthens our interpretation that changes in the ratio are driven by
changes in the importance of the numerator variable.
Our results provide insight in the sovereign credit rating process that are relevant to credit rating
agencies, financial investors and governments. The model can be used by credit rating agencies as an
empirical approximation for their credit rating process. Furthermore, predictions of the credit rating
for non-rated countries can be obtained. Finally, our quantification of the determinants of sovereign
credit ratings can help sovereigns to better understand the drivers of their credit rating.
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Appendix A. Data Appendix
Table A.1: The sovereign credit rating categories used by S&P, Moody’s and Fitch.
Category number S&P Moody’s Fitch
21 AAA Aaa AAA
20 AA+ Aa1 AA+
19 AA Aa2 AA
18 AA- Aa3 AA-
17 A+ A1 A+
16 A A2 A
15 A- A3 A-
14 BBB+ Baa1 BBB+
13 BBB Baa2 BBB
12 BBB- Baa3 BBB-
11 BB+ Ba1 BB+
10 BB Ba2 BB
9 BB- Ba3 BB-
8 B+ B1 B+
7 B B2 B
6 B- B3 B-
5 CCC+ Caa1 CCC+
4 CCC Caa2 CCC
3 CCC- Caa3 CCC-
2 CC Ca CC
1 SD/D C D/RD
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Table A.2: The countries included in the sample for S&P, Moody’s and Fitch, denoted by ‘x’.
S&P Moody’s Fitch
Argentina x x x
Australia x x x
Austria x x x
Bahamas, The x
Bahrain x x x
Barbados x x
Belgium x x x
Belize x x
Bolivia x x
Botswana x
Brazil x x x
Bulgaria x x x
Canada x x x
Chile x x x
China x x x
Colombia x x x
Costa Rica x x x
Croatia x x x
Cyprus x x x
Czech Republic x x x
Denmark x x x
Dominican Republic x x
Ecuador x x x
Egypt, Arab Rep. x x x
El Salvador x x x
Estonia x x x
Fiji x
Finland x x x
France x x x
Germany x x x
Greece x x x
Guatemala x x
Honduras x
Hong Kong SAR, China x x x
Hungary x x x
Iceland x x x
India x x x
Indonesia x x x
Ireland x x x
Israel x x x
Italy x x x
Jamaica x x
Japan x x x
Jordan x x
Kazakhstan x x x
Korea, Rep. x x x
Kuwait x x x
S&P Moody’s Fitch
Latvia x x x
Lebanon x x x
Lithuania x x x
Luxembourg x x x
Malta x x x
Mauritius x
Mexico x x x
Morocco x x
Netherlands x x x
New Zealand x x x
Nicaragua x
Norway x x x
Oman x x
Pakistan x x
Panama x x x
Papua New Guinea x x
Paraguay x x
Peru x x x
Philippines x x x
Poland x x x
Portugal x x x
Qatar x x
Romania x x x
Russian Federation x x x
Saudi Arabia x
Senegal x
Singapore x x x
Slovak Republic x x x
Slovenia x x x
South Africa x x x
Spain x x x
Suriname x
Sweden x x x
Switzerland x x x
Taiwan x x x
Thailand x x x
Trinidad and Tobago x x
Tunisia x x
Turkey x x x
Ukraine x x x
United Arab Emirates x
United Kingdom x x x
United States x x x
Uruguay x x x
Venezuela, RB x x x
Vietnam x x x
Appendix B. The composite likelihood estimator of the multi-year ordered probit model
Appendix B.1. The composite likelihood function
The logarithm of the composite likelihood function LC(θ), defined in (5), can be written as
logLC(θ) =
N∑
i=1
T−1∑
s=1
T∑
t=s+1
Cs∑
j=1
Ct∑
k=1
I[yis = j, yit = k]× logP (Yis = j, Yit = k) , (B.1)
where yis and yit denote the observed category of variables Yis and Yit. P (Yis = j, Yit = k) is given
by
P (Yis = j, Yit = k) = P
(
τ j−1is < νis < τ
j
is, τ
k−1
it < νit < τ
k
it
)
= Φ2(τ
j
is, τ
k
it; Σst) + Φ2(τ
j−1
is , τ
k−1
it ; Σst)− Φ2(τ jis, τk−1it ; Σst)− Φ2(τ j−1is , τkit; Σst), (B.2)
where Φ2(·, ·; ρ) is the cdf of the bivariate normal distribution function with correlation parameter ρ
and unit variances, and where τ lit is defined as
τ lit = τ
l
t − βtxit,
for i in 1, ..., N , t in 1, ..., T and l in 0, ..., Ct.
Appendix B.2. The covariance matrix of the composite likelihood estimator
The covariance matrix of the composite likelihood estimator Cov(θˆ) equals the inverse of the
Godambe’s sandwich information matrix G(θ) (Zhao and Joe, 2005)
Cov(θˆ) = G(θ)−1 = H(θ)−1J(θ)H(θ)−1, (B.3)
where
J(θ) = E
[(
∂ logLC(θ)
∂θ
)(
∂ logLC(θ)
∂θ
)′]
H(θ) = E
[
∂2 logLC(θ)
∂θ∂θ′
]
,
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where θ is the vector collecting all unknown elements, as defined in Section 3.1. The matrices H(θ)
and J(θ) can be estimated as follows (Bhat et al., 2010; Ferdous et al., 2010; Varin et al., 2011)
Jˆ(θˆ) =
N∑
i=1
[(
∂ logLCi (θ)
∂θ
)(
∂ logLCi (θ)
∂θ
)′]
θˆ
=
N∑
i=1
T−1∑
s=1
T∑
t=s+1
Cs∑
j=1
Ct∑
k=1
I[yis = j, yit = k]
P (Yis = j, Yit = k)
∂P (Yis = j, Yit = k)
∂θ

θˆ
×
T−1∑
s=1
T∑
t=s+1
Cs∑
j=1
Ct∑
k=1
I[yis = j, yit = k]
P (Yis = j, Yit = k)
∂P (Yis = j, Yit = k)
∂θ
′
θˆ
(B.4)
and
Hˆ(θˆ) =
N∑
i=1
[
∂2 logLCi (θ)
∂θ∂θ′
]
θˆ
=
N∑
i=1
T−1∑
s=1
T∑
t=s+1
Cs∑
j=1
Ct∑
k=1
I[yis = j, yit = k]
[
∂2 logP (Yis = j, Yit = k)
∂θ∂θ′
]
θˆ
= −
N∑
i=1
T−1∑
s=1
T∑
t=s+1
Cs∑
j=1
Ct∑
k=1
[
I[yis = j, yit = k]
P (Yis = j, Yit = k)2
∂P (Yis = j, Yit = k)
∂θ
∂P (Yis = j, Yit = k)
∂θ
′]
θˆ
, (B.5)
where LCi is defined in (6) and the θˆ subscript denotes that the function is evaluated at the composite
likelihood estimator θˆ.
For 1 ≤ i ≤ N , 1 ≤ s < t ≤ T , j in 1, ..., Cs and k in 1, ..., Ct, the nonzero elements of the vector
∂P (Yis=j,Yit=k)
∂θ used in equations (B.4) and (B.5) can be computed from (B.2) and are given below:
- the component corresponding to τ j−1s with 2 ≤ j ≤ Cs:
φ(τ j−1is )
(
Φ(
τk−1it − Σstτ j−1is√
1− Σ2st
)− Φ(τ
k
it − Σstτ j−1is√
1− Σ2st
)
)
, (B.6)
- the component corresponding to τ js with 1 ≤ j ≤ Cs − 1:
φ(τ jis)
(
Φ(
τkit − Σstτ jis√
1− Σ2st
)− Φ(τ
k−1
it − Σstτ jis√
1− Σ2st
)
)
, (B.7)
- the component corresponding to τk−1t with 2 ≤ k ≤ Ct:
φ(τk−1it )
(
Φ(
τ j−1is − Σstτk−1it√
1− Σ2st
)− Φ(τ
j
is − Σstτk−1it√
1− Σ2st
)
)
, (B.8)
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- the component corresponding to τkt with 1 ≤ k ≤ Ct − 1:
φ(τkit)
(
Φ(
τ jis − Σstτkit√
1− Σ2st
)− Φ(τ
j−1
is − Σstτkit√
1− Σ2st
)
)
, (B.9)
- the p components corresponding to βs:
10
(−xis)
{
(φ(τ jis)Φ(
τkit − Σstτ jis√
1− Σ2st
) + φ(τ j−1is )Φ(
τk−1it − Σstτ j−1is√
1− Σ2st
)
−φ(τ jis)Φ(
τk−1it − Σstτ jis√
1− Σ2st
)− φ(τ j−1is )Φ(
τkit − Σstτ j−1is√
1− Σ2st
)
}
, (B.10)
- the p components corresponding to βt:
(−xit)
{
φ(τkit)Φ(
τ jis − Σstτkit√
1− Σ2st
) + φ(τk−1it )Φ(
τ j−1is − Σstτk−1it√
1− Σ2st
)
−φ(τkit)Φ(
τ j−1is − Σstτkit√
1− Σ2st
)− φ(τk−1it )Φ(
τ jis − Σstτk−1it√
1− Σ2st
)
}
, (B.11)
- the component corresponding to ρ:
|t− s|ρ|t−s|−1
×
(
φ2(τ
j
is, τ
k
it; Σst) + φ2(τ
j−1
is , τ
k−1
it ; Σst)− φ2(τ jis, τk−1it ; Σst)− φ2(τ j−1is , τkit; Σst)
)
, (B.12)
where Φ(·) denotes the standard normal distribution function, φ(·) denotes the standard normal
density function and φ2(·, ·; Σst) denotes the bivariate normal density function with correlation
parameter Σst and unit variances.
Appendix B.3. Implementation of the composite likelihood estimator
We perform two reparameterizations. First, we write the autoregressive parameter ρ, between -1
and 1, as the hyperbolic tangent transformation of an unrestricted parameter ρatanh. Second, in line
with Greene and Hensher (2010), we reparametrize the threshold coefficients τ lt to ensure that the
ordering τ it < τ
j
t for i < j is preserved. Define γ
j
t , for each t in 1, ..., T as
τ1t = γ
1
t
τ jt = τ
j−1
t + exp(γ
j
t ) for j in 2, ..., Ct − 1.
10In (B.10), we use the convention that the first component equals zero when both j = Cs and k = Ct and that the
second component equals zero when both j = 1 and k = 1. A similar convention applies for (B.11).
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We maximize the composite likelihood using the BFGS algorithm implemented in the ‘optim’
function of the R package ‘stats’. The gradient of the composite likelihood function, which is used
in the BFGS optimization algorithm, is computed analytically from (B.1). The bivariate normal
probabilities of the pairwise composite loglikelihood function in (B.1) are computed using the Genz
(1992) algorithm implemented in the R package mnormt. The starting values for the parameters βt
and γjt are chosen as the maximum likelihood estimates from the single-year ordered probit model.
The starting values of the ρatanh parameter is the inverse hyperbolic tangent transformation of
the average of the estimates of the off-diagonal elements of the estimated covariance matrix of the
seemingly unrelated linear regression model to the power 1/|t− s|, where s and t denote the row and
column number.
29
  
 
FACULTY OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS 
Naamsestraat 69 bus 3500 
3000 LEUVEN, BELGIË 
tel. + 32 16 32 66 12 
fax + 32 16 32 67 91 
info@econ.kuleuven.be 
www.econ.kuleuven.be 
